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“The EU is continuing to make demands that are incompatible with our 
independence… we cannot accept a deal that doesn’t leave us in control of our 
own laws or waters”  









1 Robert Fisk, “Boris's Last Push for Brexit Sees Him Kissing Fish and Posing for Selfies as New Poll Gives Leave 
the Narrowest of Leads,” The Sun (The Sun, June 22, 2016), https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1326026/boriss-last-
push-for-brexit-sees-him-kissing-fish-and-posing-for-selfies-in-a-gruelling-final-day-of-campaigning/. 








During the ‘exit negotiations’ between the United Kingdom (UK) and the European 
Union (EU), the relatively economically insignificant fishing industry received a 
disproportionate share of not just UK media attention, but global press as well; not to mention an 
array of political machinations which almost halted a free trade agreement between two of the 
world’s largest trading partners. This evaluation seeks to understand why such disproportional 
influence existed. Why were both the EU and the UK coming to blows over something as 
seemingly innocuous as fishing; why were they willing to risk the most significant trade 
agreement in recent European history over a few fish? Existing subject matter literature cites 
history and symbolism as the main factors that brought fishing into the limelight, almost gilling a 
multi-billion-dollar trade deal between these two primary trade partners. However, while this 
paper concurs with existing literature analysis, it finds further illumination in the murky waters 
of electoral politics. It argues that electoral politics also brought fishing to the trade talk surface 
as the Conservative Party leveraged the industry to demonstrate that they were protecting a 
disenfranchised industry, while aiming to convey the benefits of Brexit to maintain votes and 
prevent Scottish succession. On a broader scale, this paper is about the potential ramifications 
that domestic politicians have on free trade agreements, especially in this new global populist era 
where the leverage of the disenfranchised is key; it is an affirmation of the American saying that 
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A Fishy Paradox 
  
Most of the Brexit drama––especially from an economic perspective––did not make 
sense. From an economic point of view, it made more sense for the United Kingdom (UK) to 
remain in the European Union (EU) with access to the European Single Market (Single Market) 
and their largest trading partners, especially in an environment of increasing globalization. But, 
even with the vast majority of expert opinions concluding that leaving the EU would be 
economically disastrous for the UK, in the summer of 2016, its citizens voted to leave. However, 
Brexit was really not just about economics, but rather a reaction of nostalgia and entrenchment 
vis-à-vis a world that was rapidly becoming more interconnected, with the political and 
economic coalition known as the EU leading the way.  
As the offshoring of lower relative productivity sectors of the economy and the 
development of more technologically advanced goods and services providers sailed ahead, once 
thriving industries were no longer key to the economy, leaving many from the UK workforce 
feeling stranded in an unnavigable wake of market disruption, while Brussels charted a course 
toward ever increasing globalization.The disenfranchised felt like they were under the thumb of 
Brussels, having to abide by laws that were unfavorable to the UK. A rather sentimental notion 
of sovereignty and the call for “taking back control” over the reality of the contemporaneous 
interconnected world resonated within certain portions of the British populi. Their goal was to 
withdraw from their largest economic market to regain full regulatory control yet maintain 
access to the Single Market via a free trade deal that represented over 40% of its exports.4 A bit 
of a contradictory paradox, but that is Brexit in a nutshell.  
 





When the time came to negotiate this free trade deal, economic reasoning took a back 
seat, again. As the final days of the deal approached, most of the negotiations had been settled, 
and yet the UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson and EU President of the Commission Ursula von 
der Leyen almost derailed the entire deal for the seemingly economically insignificant fishing 
industry––while enjoying a dinner together of pumpkin soup with scallops and steamed turbot 
with mashed potatoes (a not so subtle nod to the feud).5 Johnson left the dinner asserting that, 
“Very large gaps remain between the two sides (regarding a fishing deal) and it is still unclear 
whether these can be bridged” while von der Leyen said that, “We understand each other’s 
positions. But [we] remain far apart.”6 There were only 15 days left to seal the deal, and it 
seemed that there was no consensus on fishing in sight.  
While serving scallops and turbot made sense for the dinner, given they were discussing a 
fishing deal, the fact that this particular industry almost gilled the entirety of the trade talks did 
not make sense as it was seemingly at odds with common economic and mathematical sense. The 
industry employs roughly 12,000 workers out of a UK workforce of over 33 million (excluding 
the processing industry with employees a larger portion); represents 0.1% of British domestic 
 
5 Adam Coghlan, “Breaking Bread Over Brexit With Fish in Brussels, a Short Story,” Eater London, December 10, 
2020, https://london.eater.com/2020/12/10/22167244/no-deal-brexit-fishing-boris-johnson-ursula-von-der-leven-
dinner.  
6 Daniel Boffey, “The Brexit Brussels Dinner: Fish and Frank Talk but No One Left Satisfied,” The Guardian, 





output; 0.2% of EU GDP; and accounts for just 0.8% of total EU-UK trade. 7,8,9,10 It produces a 
little more than £1 billion, or 0.33% of the total £300 billion worth of UK exports. Thus, it 
seemed the UK was effectively putting at risk over 99% of its trade with the EU to defend an 
industry that makes up a mere fraction of the world’s sixth-largest economy. Even Harrods in 
London contributes more to the British economy.11 This begs the question: why was the British 
government prepared to potentially risk the most important trade negotiations in recent British 
history over an industry that barely represents an economic needle, let alone move it?  
 
Literature Review 
Throughout the negotiations, there was a plethora of academic chatter regarding the UK 
fishing industry: Jeremy Phillipson’s “a Sea of troubles: Brexit and the fisheries question”12; 
Sophia Kopela’s “Historic Fishing Rights in the Law of the Sea and Brexit''13; Stijn Billiet’s 
“Brexit and Fisheries: Fish and Chips Aplenty?”14, and so it went. However, while these articles 
did a nice job of outlining the effects Brexit will have on the fishing industry, as well as the 
history of the fishing industry in relation to the EU, they did not address why fishing was so 
 
7 Elena Ares et al., “UK Fisheries Statistics,” House of Commons Library, November 23, 2020, 
https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn02788/. 
8 Reuters Staff, “PM Sold out Fish in Brexit Trade Deal, Fishermen Say,” Reuters, December 26, 2020, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-fish/pm-sold-out-fish-in-brexit-trade-deal-fishermen-say-
idUSKBN2900KG. 
9 Kat Haladus, “Fisheries: An Industry That's Worth 0.1% of the UK's GDP Is Holding up the Talks,” UK Customs 
Solutions, December 23, 2020, https://ukcustomssolutions.co.uk/2020/12/23/fisheries-an-industry-thats-worth-0-1-
of-the-uks-gdp-is-holding-up-the-talks/. 
10 Matt Bevington, Professor Anand Menon, and Professor Jonathan Portes, “Fishing: Why Is It Such a Tricky Issue 
in UK-EU Negotiations?” UK in a Changing Europe, November 10, 2020, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/fishing-
why-is-it-such-a-tricky-issue-in-uk-eu-negotiations/. 
11 British Sea Fishing, “Brexit and Britain’s Fisheries,” British Sea Fishing, January 20, 2021, 
https://britishseafishing.co.uk/brexit-and-britains-fisheries/. 
12 Jeremy Phillipson and David Symes, “'A Sea of Troubles': Brexit and the Fisheries Question” 90 (2018): pp. 168-
173, https://doi.org/10.31230/osf.io/fxnqj. 
13 Sophia Kopela, “Historic Fishing Rights in the Law of the Sea and Brexit,” Leiden Journal of International Law 
32, no. 4 (2019): pp. 695-713, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0922156519000438. 





crucial to trade talks. They mentioned the economic insignificant paradox but did not seek to 
understand the genesis of the paradox.  
There were, however, a few observers that did try to understand this paradox, finding 
answers in the history and symbolism of Brexit. Professor Anand Menon argued that Johnson’s 
focus on the repatriation of fishing rights was instrumentally symbolic and relevant because it 
represented a commitment to the “left behind” towns and industries, and thus he was committed 
to fighting for them in the trade talks.15 He also attributed the relevance to media’s coverage of 
the issue, amplifying the issue and, in a sense, forcing Boris to act.16 In a similar vein, Matthew 
Bevington asserted that fishing was merely symbolic and a metaphor for the wider movement 
fueling Brexit, as such, politicians focused on it in order to create an image that the government 
was helping the citizens, particularly, the disenfranchised.17 Other scholars, such as Craig 
McAngus, Christopher Huggins and John Connolly found answers in Europeanization, stating 
that fishing was one of the most Europeanized policies for the UK, thus it makes sense that it 
would receive the most attention throughout trade talks. 18,19 But, what about the role of electoral 
politics and elections in all of this? Bevington’s and Menon’s arguments centered around a 
government trying to appease the fishing industry and represent the forgotten communities by 
 
15 Tom McTague, “Why Britain's Brexit Mayhem Was Worth It,” The Atlantic (Atlantic Media Company, 
December 24, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/12/brexit-trade-deal-uk-eu/617509/. 
16 Anand Menon and UK in a Changing Europe Team, “Fisheries and Brexit,” The UK in a Changing Europe, June 
2020, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Fisheries-and-Brexit.pdf. 
17 Matt Bevington, Professor Anand Menon, and Professor Jonathan Portes, “Fishing: Why Is It Such a Tricky Issue 
in UK-EU Negotiations?” 
18 Craig McAngus and Christopher Huggins, et al., “The Politics and Governance of UK Fisheries after 
Brexit.” Political Insight 9, no. 3 (September 2018): 8-11 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2041905818796570. 
19 John Connolly et al., “The Governance Capacities of Brexit from a Scottish Perspective: The Case of Fisheries 







amplifying them in the talks, but for what objective? To land a ‘good deal’ for the community so 
as to maintain their office? A cynical but often realistic view.  
As on par with the rest of Brexit, the answer as to why fishing became so preeminent in 
the trade talks does not lie in economic reasoning, but rather in convoluted domestic politics. 
Brexit was not solely about the economics of the UK leaving the EU––only thinking in those 
terms misses the point––but rather it was about democratic freedom and re-gaining sovereignty. 
Thus, it only makes sense that the trade talks would reflect this theme as well: prioritizing 
industries that were examples of “taking back control” and revitalizing a domestic industry that 
was lost under the heel of the EU boot.  
The newly formed Johnson administration needed an industry that would resonate well 
with that portion of the British population that voted to leave and expected to see the campaign 
promises of sovereignty realized. The industry that conveniently and succinctly represented these 
values and proved to be rather important for the Conservative Party from an electoral 
perspective, was in fact, the fishing industry, specifically the Scottish fishing industry. The 
Scottish fishers were an important constituent to the secession-seeking Scottish National Party 
(SNP), which was, and still is, demanding secession; a situation that the Conservative Party does 
not want to occur on their watch. The Tories needed to appease the Scottish fisheries to keep 
their votes in Scotland so that Scotland would not turn entirely to the SNP in the upcoming May 
2021 elections. Additionally, they needed to show Scotland that Johnson was representing 
Scottish interests in the international arena to have more “clout” in the inevitable independence 
showdown between the Scottish Tories and the SNP over the next few years. Perhaps this is a bit 




in trade talks, and domestic electoral gains often materially influence their tack as they adjust for 
the ever-changing political winds.  
 
II: Why Do Politicians Protect and Amplify Certain Industries in Free-Trade 
Agreements?   
  
Theoretical Frameworks: Lobbying Influence and the Self-Serving Politician 
Buoyed by that skeptical view, there are a multitude of theories regarding the significance 
of certain industries in trade talks, finding answers in politicians’ electoral objectives. Typically, 
democratically elected/appointed officials ultimately determine trade agreements. The politics of 
trade agreements are often seen as a two-level game––theorized by Robert Putnam in 1989––in 
which public sector officials/politicians are simultaneously in negotiations at both the 
international and the domestic levels. Putnam assesses that domestic groups pressure the officials 
to adopt favorable policies, as these officials in turn seek to amplify their power by developing 
relationships with these groups who offer support via votes or campaign contributions.20 
Politicians then go to the international level and seek to maximize their ability to satisfy 
domestic pressures while balancing the needs of their international partners.21 While Putnam’s 
theory is useful to set a simple and general relational framework between the domestic and 
international level, and illustrates just how entangled the two are, negotiations are far more 
complex in practice with a variety of influential factors.  
 
20 Corneliu Bjola and Ilan Manor, “In the Long Run,” In the Long Run, July 19, 2018, 
http://www.inthelongrun.org/criaviews/article/revisiting-putnams-two-level-game-theory-in-the-digital-age-
domestic-digita/. 
21 Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt and Patrick A. Mello, “Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis,” Oxford 




Trade policies are often sold as ‘welfare maximizers’ that liberalize trade and result in a 
net benefit for citizens and industry. Such analyses cast the government as a benevolent guardian 
of national interests, however one cannot help but add another layer of complexity to the 
situation and think about the other influential interests at stake: the self-serving political interests 
and electoral gains, especially in this new populist era. This begs the question: are these focused 
policies really maximizing voters’ welfare and/or a specific industry, or are politicians focusing 
on that industry and promoting said policy to maximize their own political welfare? As Gene 
Grossman and Elhanan Helpman emphasize in “Trade Talks and Trade Wars,” this question 
becomes especially relevant given: 
“The public is typically less than fully informed on trade issues… these representatives 
need not always select policies that maximize the welfare of the median voter. Other 
policies may serve the politicians goal of being re-elected or any other further objectives 
they may have.”22  
Throughout the late 20th century, political scientists and economists considered this and 
began analyzing the politicians’ ‘true’ intentions by looking at the choices made by elected 
officials who received financial and other ‘incentives’ from lobbying groups. Two strands of 
theories emerged regarding how the politician is influenced: Stephen Magee, William Brock, and 
Leslie Young (1989)23 assess the role of lobby groups and campaign finances leading up to the 
 
22 Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, “Trade Wars and Trade Talks,” Journal of Political Economy 103, no. 4 
(1995): pp. 671, https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3450062/Helpman_TradeWars.pdf 




election while Sam Peltzman (1976)24 analyzes an incumbent administration in a position to 
establish trade policy but had an upcoming election to think about.  
Magee, Brock, and Young find that leading up to the campaign, a party will typically 
commit to certain trade policies as part of their election platform. Lobby groups then analyze 
each platform and pick a party in which to contribute. These contributions then fund campaign 
expenditures and may correlate with an increased probability of winning the election. Once in 
office, the party will then champion the policy and amplify the interest group’s wants.25 
From another perspective, Peltzman argues that once politicians are in office, they seek to 
remain in office, and will thus support legislation that will appease certain interest groups that 
will support the politician during their re-election. For an incumbent, it is not just about the 
money as they have to balance both money and votes in a way that maximizes political support 
in order to secure re-election.26 For example, if they write policies that increase producers’ 
profits, they will gain their votes, but simultaneously lose the votes of consumers who will have 
to pay more to the producers.27 It is a balancing act.  
Building upon these ideas and incorporating Putnam’s two-level game theory, Grossman 
and Helpman (1992) introduced special-interest politics into the analysis of international trade 
relations seeking to understand how domestic political pressures determine negotiations and 
relations between foreign counterparts. They focus on incumbent governments interacting at the 
international level, but rather than analyzing the profit-maximizing politicians, they looked at the 
profit-maximizing lobbying groups. They found that “lobbies seek to curry favor with politicians 
 
24 Sam Peltzman, “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” The Journal of Law & Economics 19, no. 2 
(August 1976): pp. 211-240, https://doi.org/10.3386/w0133. 
25 Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, 677. 
26 Ibid. 





who covet their financial support… seeking to maximize the aggregate welfare of the lobby 
groups’ members.”28 As the politician’s objective is to maximize their own political welfare––
which often relies on having a large number of contributions––they champion the policy of those 
who donate the most. For example, a congressperson was more likely to vote against the Trade 
Act of 1974 if they received large donations from a major labor union that opposed the bill.29 
Differing from Magee et al., they see the lobby groups trying to dictate policy via donations, 
rather than picking politicians with advantageous policy agendas and then donating.30 In short, 
those who donate the most have purchased the access to influence the most during trade talks. 
But what if the industry that seems to be most influential does not have deep pockets? In 
1982, Arye Hillman considered Peltzman and tried to understand why politicians put their 
support behind declining industries that have little special-interest money and/or little economic 
or voting influence. 31 Many scholars argue that politicians protect declining industries for social 
merit, but Hillman disagrees, finding that it is more about politicians' political aspirations than 
social merit. Hillman finds that they are not protecting and promoting the declining industry for 
altruistic reasons––as the industry will still typically decline even with protection––but rather for 
self-interest motives to maximize political support32 Even if such protections are manifested as 
being “selfless”, Hillman asserts that self-interest and re-election politics remain the latent 
motives. To Hillman, it is less about financial contributions, rather influence comes from the 
political and social relevance of that declining industry to the politician’s agenda.  
 
28 Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, 678.  
29 Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, 704.  
30 Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, 676.  
31 Arye L. Hillman, "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives." The American Economic 
Review 72, no. 5 (1982): 1180-187. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1812033. 




But is it merely just the government picking the declining industry? Or are the declining 
industries also picking the government? In “Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why 
Governments Pick Losers'', Richard Baldwin and Frederic Robert-Nicoud use Grossman and 
Helpman’s 1994 pressure group approach to concluded that while governmental policy is 
influenced by pressure groups that employ expensive lobbying tactics, losers (such as declining 
industries) actually lobby more diligently through other means and do not need to use expensive 
lobbying.33 They conclude that it is not the government that picks the losers, but rather it is the 
losers that pick the government.34 
 
Eliminating Campaign Contributions in the UK 
 
Do the answers as to why the declining fishing industry became so relevant and 
influential lie in Magee’s et al. and Grossman/Helpman’s campaign finance lobbying, or 
Hillman’s self-serving/re-election interests, or Baldwin’s and Robert-Nicoud loser lobbying? Or 
is it an amalgamation of all? After analyzing over 7,000 donations to both Conservative Party 
and Unionist Party between 2016-2020, it seems that Brexit and fishing do not fit into Magee’s 
et al. and Grossman/Helpman’s work as the fishing industry––the Scottish Fishing Federation 
and National Federation of Fishermen––did not appear to make contributions to the party. 
Rather, the relatively material contributions came from the fishing towns, however, such 
donations did not correlate with the amount of influence achieved.  
 
33 Richard E. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric, “Entry and asymmetric lobbying: why governments pick 
losers.” PSPE working papers, March 2007. Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political 
Science, London, UK. 




Figure 1 illustrates that from 2016-2020, of the £169,449,385 donated to both parties, 
only £275,950 came from relevant coastal towns; that is roughly 0.163%.35 Relevant coastal 
towns are those that have been discussed the most throughout Brexit and the trade talks 
regarding fishing, including Moray and Aberdeenshire in Scotland, and Grimsby, Scarborough 
and Whitby, and Kingston upon Hull in England. “Other” includes all other donations, such as 
individuals like Peter K Hargreaves of Hargreaves Lansdown plc––a financial services company 
that donated £1,000,000 in 2019––and companies like the manufacturer of equipment for 
construction J.C.B. Service, which donated £1,500,000 in 2017 and then again in 2019. It is a bit 
of a conundrum, as one would think that the more robust sectors that donate the most would 
receive the highest levels of government support, which is in line with Magee’s et al. and 
Grossman/Helpman’s findings, rather than the ailing sectors, such as fishing. Even if UK 
campaign contributions are not as influential as they are in the US, one would still think those 
who donate more would reap the influential benefits. Even two London neighborhoods––
Kensington and Cities of London and Westminster––contributed almost double the amount of 
the five coastal cities, as seen in figure 2. The towns were not nearly the largest contributors.  
 











With that, however, there are a few considerations that must be taken into account. First, 
as briefly mentioned earlier, it must be noted that campaign contributions in the UK differ 
 
36 Ibid.  




substantially from those in the US; they are not as influential nor determinant. Unlike in the US, 
UK campaigns are normally very short––lasting a maximum of 3-4 weeks, with limits on ads 
outside this period. But, nonetheless, they should still be considered when trying to understand 
the influence of the fishing industry as the Tory party has received larger than typical donations 
in the past few election cycles.38 Second, the majority of donations go through the central party–
–roughly 3,655 entities (individuals and companies) donated £150,003,450––resulting in an 
inability to determine the degree to which certain players are connected to the fishing industry 
donated.39 While one can see the list of donations to the central party, one does not know if that 
donor is linked to the fishing industry. Lastly, it must also be noted that in recent years, the 
Tories have been called out for not being transparent enough regarding those behind large 
donations.40 Thus, this must be taken into account when considering fishing's influence via 
donations. The donations might have been there, but to what degree is unknown.  
If it is not campaign donation influence, what kind of electoral influence is it? They are a 
declining industry who did not donate, what political factors are at play? Do the fishers sit in key 
seats? Are they in ‘hostile terrain’? Are they key to an enhanced Boris Johnson agenda? Hillman 
would say look to Boris Johnson’s political agenda and re-election goals as a potential answer as 
to why he vouched for the “declining” or “losing” fishing industry during trade talks. But 
Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud would say look to the loser’s agenda. Did fishing pick the Tories 
and Boris, or did the Tories pick fishing? 
 
38 Peter Geoghegan, Seth Thévoz, and Jenna Corderoy, “Revealed: The Elite Dining Club behind £130m+ 
Donations to the Tories,” openDemocracy, November 22, 2019, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/dark-money-
investigations/revealed-the-elite-dining-club-behind-130m-donations-to-the-tories/. 
39 UK Electoral Commission donation records 2016-2020. 
40 Peter Geoghegan, Seth Thévoz, and Jenna Corderoy, “Revealed: The Elite Dining Club behind £130m+ 




 As we will see, it is actually a mix of all. Fishing did lobby the government via media 
rather than campaign contributions throughout the EU referendum and the trade talks, making it 
quite relevant in final trade talks. Concurrently, the declining fishing community became 
relevant to the Conservatives in order to maximize political support for electoral gains, re-
election, and legacy. It appears that Conservatives needed the fishing community of North East 
Scotland for many reasons during the Brexit process as Theresa May tried to win a majority in 
Parliament and Boris Johnson tried to illustrate the benefits of Brexit to keep the community 
from voting for the separatist SNP. In short, one should consider that they risked everything for 
fishing so as to illustrate that they cared about the community to secure re-election, specifically 
in certain Scottish fishing communities that ran the risk of turning to the SNP, who would then 
dominate Scotland and call for another independence referendum. Thus, it seems that while the 
answers do not fully lie in the above theories, the theories posited by both Baldwin and Robert-
Nicoud as well as Hillman provide interesting frameworks to analyze why fishing became so 
influential in Brexit. To see how this all fits together, the story of Brexit and fishing should be 
traced. First, we will understand the Brexit path and how fishing––particularly the Scottish 
fisher––were unassumingly at the core of it all along. Then we will dive into the trade talks and 










III: A Deep Seeded History    
 
Part 1: How did the UK get to Brexit? 
   
An Overview of UK/EU Relationship: A Troubled Beginning 
           
As Professor Vivien Schmidt and Jolyon Howorth note, “Brexit was, in many ways, an 
accident waiting to happen.”41 The UK and the EU always had an ambivalent relationship; a 
noncommittal half-in, half-out, the UK has been referred to as the ‘awkward partner’. In the 
aftermath of WWII, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created in 1951 as a 
means to ensure stability across the continent by linking economies. Initially, the UK distanced 
itself from the ECSC but embraced the idea of united Europe, just at an arm’s length. Winston 
Churchill was a strong proponent of a unified Europe––urging European unity to ensure peace––
but would never join as the UK had an alternative––the Atlantic Charter. The UK saw itself 
separate from the rest of the EU––not just physically, but culturally and mentally as well. They 
were an island empire on which the sun never set where British exceptionalism reigned, even if 
their history was primarily a continental story with “her destiny mainly determined by relations 
with the rest of Europe rather than with the wider world”, as Irish Historian Brendan Simms 
summed it up.42 But as the empire declined in stature and size during the post war recovery 
period, she realized her loss of hegemony to the US, and that in order to achieve her global 
ambitions in the new post imperial world, she may find herself in a useful position to be the 
bridge between the US and the European Economic Community (EEC); simplistically speaking, 
the new and improved ECSC.  
 
41 Vivien Schmidt and Jolyon Howorth, “Brexit: What Happened? What Is Going to Happen?” Politique Étrangère, 
no. 4 (2016): pp. 123-138, https://doi.org/10.3917/pe.164.0123. 
42 Kevin H. O'Rourke, “A Short History of Brexit: from Brentry to Backstop,” in A Short History of Brexit: from 




After two attempts to join, only to be met with rejection by French President Charles de 
Gaulle––who held the opinion that the UK had no interest in creating a European political 
project––the UK finally joined in 1973 under Tory Prime Minister Edward Heath, three years 
after de Gaulle’s passing.43 While many were happy, many were less so. Labour leader Hugh 
Gaitskell argued that a federal Europe would mean the “end of Britain as an independent 
European state… the end of a thousand years of history” and promised to hold a referendum if 
elected.44 Two years later in 1975, Labour formed a government under Harold Wilson and held 
the UK’s first EU referendum.45 Although closely divided, the UK would vote “Yes” to a united 
Europe, with the then Europhile Conservative leader Margret Thatcher leading the way for the 
Conservatives, while Labour remained extremely divided.46 
 However, there might be something to be said about de Gaulle's veto on the grounds of 
creating a European political project. With the initial referendum only a mere two years after 
entering, as well as a series of opt-outs––such as the single currency and the borderless scheme 
known as Schengen––the UK never really embraced deeper political, cultural, and the 
ideological ambitions of her partners across the Channel. Rather, she desired a more 
intergovernmental approach to a union instead of supranational. There are three main decision-
making bodies in the EU that all vie for power: the European Council, the European Parliament, 
and the European Commission. An intergovernmental approach would like to see decision-
making power vested in the member states through bodies like the European Council–– which is 
made up of heads of states––or even the European Parliament. The supranational, on the other 
 
43 Vivien Schmidt and Jolyon Howorth, page 4. 
44 Kevin H. O'Rourke, 74. 
45 James Walsh, “Britain's 1975 Europe Referendum: What Was It like Last Time?” The Guardian, February 25, 
2016, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/25/britains-1975-europe-referendum-what-was-it-like-last-
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hand, sees power vested in institutional bodies such as the European Commission, made up of 
unelected “Eurocrats” who, as the then contributor to The Telegraph Boris Johnson chimed, puts 
“the UK in shackles.”47 
 Such anti-EU rhetoric often comes from Eurosceptics and is represented in both the 
Labour and the Conservative parties. While it seems to be a trending phrase now, Euroscepticism 
is not new. There was always a notion of us vs. them, but Margert Thatcher turning Eurosceptic 
in the 1980s became a christening moment, if you will, for the Eurosceptics who would go on to 
become Brexiteers.  
As Schmidt and Howorth point out, Thatcher did not always think “Europe has always 
been a source of problems (Julius Caesar, William the Conqueror, Philip II, Napoleon, Hitler, 
Stalin) rather than of solutions.”48 In fact, Thatcher was briefly an enthusiastic Europhile and was 
a keen backer of the “Yes” campaign in the 1975 EU referendum. She would later feverishly 
support the Single Market. But due to budget contributions over a contentious policy area known 
as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), she pivoted.49 Feeling as though the UK unfairly 
contributed more than its fair share of funding, Thatcher secured a rebate for the CAP, but that 
did not calm the storm for long. Her hostility towards further integration continued to grow and 
reached a crescendo with the 1985 arrival of French socialist Jacques Delores as head of the 
European Commission, who championed a single currency and a European central bank. The 
EEC was becoming a far too supranational and politically integrated venture for Thatcher. 
Rhetoric of losing power and control to Brussels became common in her speeches: “We have not 
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successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a 
European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels,” 
Thatcher professed in her 1988 Bruges speech.50 While her Eurosceptic agenda and rhetoric 
would ultimately become her downfall, it planted the seed for a growing anti-Europe movement 
that would divide the Tory party––as well as Labour––and would later find its political moment 
amongst the disenfranchised in 2016, after a Conservative political opportunist negligently called 
another EU referendum when he sought to bridge a divided Tory party and secure a re-election 
win.   
 
The Birth of Brexit 
 
The electoral politics and self-serving politicians have been intertwined with Brexit since 
its inception. David Cameron called for the referendum in 2015 not because he was Eurosceptic, 
rather quite the opposite. Divides within the Tories regarding Europe had been brewing since the 
Thatcher years and were proving to be problematic for Cameron's upcoming general election, as 
the rise of a relatively new right-wing populist party––UKIP––began siphoning off the 
Conservative Eurosceptic votes. Hoping to mitigate Tory Europhile defections to more moderate 
parties such as the Liberal Democrats, while also truncating the rising Eurosceptics within the 
party, as well as regaining the Eurosceptic votes lost to UKIP, Cameron promised an EU 
membership referendum if re-elected, believing that the party would vote to remain.51 In theory, 
it appeared to be a win-win; he would be re-elected because he would be giving the Eurosceptics 
their moment, but the UK would ultimately remain in the EU. The result was a complete 
miscalculation as he underestimated just how powerful Euroscepticism had become.  
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As per his plan, he was re-elected and called for the referendum. The country split into 
two camps: Leave vs. Remain. The main topics of discussion during the campaigns centered 
around trade, EU budget, regulation, and immigration.52 The Remain campaign––backed by the 
Conservative government, half of the Conservative Party, half of the Labour Party (with the 
reluctant Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn finally turning pro-remain) the Liberal Democrats, and 
the SNP––took a negative approach, focusing their argument on the economic consequences of a 
vote to leave, failing to mention the positive reasons to stay in the EU.53 But, as mentioned, 
Brexit really was not about the economics and, as such, it did not resonate at the doorstep.  
The Leave campaigns, on the other hand, took a more emotional, visceral approach, that 
was factually flawed, but resonated well with the disenfranchised who felt that the globally 
interconnected EU was the genesis behind all their problems. They had seen their employment 
opportunities evaporate as industry left the country; they felt their jobs had been lost to 
immigration, among other xenophobic reasoning; they felt left behind and chose the EU as their 
scapegoat. The campaigns of Vote Leave, led by Boris Johnson, and Leave.EU by Nigel Farage, 
tapped into this discontent, focusing heavily on anti-immigration and regaining sovereignty, with 
a rally cry of ‘take back control’. They argued that if they left they could take back control of: (1) 
trade by creating their own trade deals, revitalizing declining industries, and bringing back jobs 
to Britain; (2) national finances by regaining the £350 million they supposedly lost a week to the 
EU––cue Boris's notorious red bus; (3) regulation by no longer following the laws created by the 
‘eurocrats’ in Brussels who know nothing about potholes in London; (4) immigration and 
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refugee inflows by leaving the EU’s freedom of movement policy (although the UK was not part 
of Schengen and had no obligations to accept any refugees).54  
The Take Back Control mantra percolated throughout the country and was succinctly 
exemplified with the simplified vignette of one industry. An industry that became a potent 
symbol of the UK’s relationship with the EU, reaching the headlines of every major newspaper: 
the fishing industry. In fact, the media pushed out over 8,200 articles regarding Brexit and the 
UK fishing industry over a 5-year period. This is almost five daily articles. Figure 3 illustrates 
how many times major British newspapers covered the subject from 2016 to 2021.   
 
Figure 355 
It appears that the politically right leaning papers covered the topic more regularly, with 
the Express covering it a total of 2,300 times and the Times and Telegraph around 500. While 
the politically left leaning, such as the Guardian, covered it less. It is interesting to think about 
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who reads these articles and how the coverage may have affected them. Express, Times, and 
Telegraph are all relatively conservative papers, but specifically anti-EU, with Boris Johnson as 
a former columnist of the Telegraph, where he wrote often about Brussels placing the “UK in 
shackles”, as well as other anti-EU related topics. This makes sense, given that in many respects, 
fishing perfectly embodied the Conservative Leave movement; a disenfranchised industry that 
felt powerless, expendable, and held deep seeded resentment towards Europe. But how did the 
industry become so disenfranchised, so firmly anti-EU, and so influential in the Brexit 
campaign? 
 




As an island nation, the British have had almost an obsession with claiming ownership 
and sovereignty of its waters to the point of war. Fishing has always been key to British identity, 
especially Scottish identity, and as such, has been a rather sensitive topic that goes right to the 
heart of British identity. For purposes of time, this review will not dive that deep into the history 
of the British quest for sovereignty of the seas––Thomas Wemyss Fulton dives deep, figuratively 
speaking of course, into this contentious history in his seminal work, “The Sovereignty of the 
Sea: An Historical Account of the Claims of England to the Dominion of the British Seas, and of 
the Evolution of the Territorial Waters”––but rather we will stay onshore and provide a brief 
overview of their relationship regarding the rights to fish British waters, as that was at the heart 




Under Queen Elizabeth I, the seas were fairly open with the English giving free access to 
the Dutch and others to fish off their shores.56 However, as the power and wealth of the Dutch 
fishing fleets began to grow, the British, especially the Scots, who were very reliant on the 
fishing industry, began to voice opposition to the Dutch fishers ‘poaching’ in their water. In 
1609, Scotland’s James VI, who ascended to the throne of England as James I, banned all foreign 
vessels from fishing in British waters, unless they obtained a license; similar to what was 
witnessed during the Brexit trade talks.57 The Anglo-Dutch wars ensued throughout the 1700s, 
with fishing as a major point of contestation.58 The fishing strife then drifted down the English 
Channel resulting in an Anglo-French rivalry, which waged throughout the 19th century as they 
sorted out fishing rights, resulting in a few Scallop Wars, most recently in 2015. In the 1950s and 
70s, the fishing wars crescendo with the famed ‘Cod Wars’ between the UK and Iceland 
regarding British access to the rich cod waters off the coast of Iceland. The violent showdowns 
played out repeatedly throughout a number of decades, with Iceland almost leaving NATO and 
falling into the Soviet orbit.59  
 
 
To Control or Not to Control, that is the Question 
 
The clash would end with the UK’s long-distance fishing fleets losing access to Iceland’s 
lucrative fishing grounds followed by a sharp decline in fishing industry revenues. Around the 
same time, the UK joined the EU, where they would be required to join the contentious Common 
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Fisheries Policy (CFP). The CFP is an EU policy that seeks to conserve fishing stocks and ensure 
fair competition in European waters by setting catching quotas for European fishing vessels 
based on pre 1983 catch activity. While the exact quantity of fish each state is allowed to catch is 
negotiated annually, quotas are still allocated today using that 1983 data point; a method also 
known as “relative stability.” 60,61 The EU is able to determine quotas in each boundary as the 
policy requires that each member state pool its sovereignty and open its Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) to all member states, creating a ‘European water’ if you will. Under the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, each country has an EEZ that extends 200-nautical miles 
from a country’s shorelines and maintains the right to explore and exploit that zone without 
interference from others (figure 4 illustrates the UK EEZ for reader’s reference).62 However, 
under EU accession policy, member states are required to open their water boundaries; 
something the UK had struggled with since the 1600s.   
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Figure 4, the red represents the UK’s EEZ that they were required to share with other 
EU coastal states, such as Denmark and France.63  
 
The UK’s fishing industry did not want to enter the CFP and pool access to its waters, 
relinquishing control over its EEZ, even though other countries have fished in it for decades; it 
was about fisher’s control. Many wondered why the Heath government did not try to negotiate 
an opt-out of the CFP––an action for which the UK is famous––or even negotiate a better deal 
for the UK. The answer circles back to Iceland. When the UK lost its long-distance access to 
Iceland, there was little inshore activity to replace it as the nation had become so dependent on 
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the white fish from the more northern seas.64 British fishers were not fishing near the British 
coast. As such, most of the quota rights for inshore fishing went to the French, Dutch, and 
Danish fishers during the accession negotiations; the UK did not have a strong counter position 
given they were not fishing in those territories.65  
It should be noted that the EU did factor in the UK’s lost Icelandic fishing opportunities 
when determining their quotas beyond the boundaries of UK waters. For example, the UK was 
given 84% of the North Sea haddock quota, 81% of North Sea monkfish quota, and 98% of west 
of Scotland prawn quota, as seen in figure 5. 66,67 The issue, however, was not regarding North 
Sea quotas, rather it was around areas like the English Channel where, in figure 5, blue was 
much greater than red. It was the fact that the UK was allocated 30% of the EU quota for fishing 
that occurred in ‘UK waters’ while the remaining 70% went to other EU members.68  
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When it came to Channel cod, France had 84% of the share while the UK maintained 9%.70 
Britain did not even make the top 5-member states with the largest value of EU catch in British 
waters; France came in first with £200 million, followed by the Netherlands and then Denmark 
(figure 6).71   
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The Resentful Fishers 
This did not sit well with the fishers who watched their industry decline just as the EU 
gained access to UK waters. When asked, “What has been the impact on not just the fishing 
industry, but the entire north east coast of Scotland since Britain joined what was then the EEC 
in 1975?” Scottish fisher Baden Gibson insisted that:  
“The EU and its fisheries policy has destroyed businesses beyond fishing… If you fish 
outside of your quota the penalties can be fierce—my worry would be that I would lose 
my boat and then I would lose everything. I realize that there must be quotas, but it 
should be fishing organizations who set those quotas” rather than Brussels.73 
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They felt that Heath sold them out for access to the Single Market, failing to negotiate any part 
of the CFP. They felt a total loss of control as they could not set quotas, as mentioned by Gibson. 
This loss of control was further exacerbated when it came down to who owned the quotas. Over 
the years, more and more foreign entities started to own British fishing fleets, with 50% of all 
English quotas ‘owned’ by British-flagged ships that were actually Spanish, Dutch, or Icelandic; 
that is about £160m worth of England's fishing quota. In Scotland, however, only 4% of annual 
catches went into the hands of foreign vessels as the Scottish industry was mostly made up of 
family-owned businesses, but discontent still loomed for the other reasons stated earlier.74,75 The 
feeling of loss of control was gripping and palpable. 
It must be noted that it was not necessarily Brussels causing the decline, but rather 
overfishing and advances in technology that prevented fishers from achieving previous catching 
thresholds as well as the aftermath of the cod wars that prevented them from fishing in certain 
areas, along with the rise of multimillion dollar fishing companies in the UK.76 But nonetheless, 
British fishers did not see it this way. From their perspective, the correlation was objectively 
clear: the UK fishing industry thrived before EU membership, but as part of the EU, it died at the 
hands of quotas. Conall Ó Duibhir analyzed fishers’ discontent in his thesis, “Uncovering rural 
resentment in the global North: A discourse analysis of how Fishing for Leave expresses and 
communicates feelings of discontent.” Figure 7 is Duibhir’s compilation of the sources of 
fisheries resentment towards the EU and is a useful summery.  
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Reforming the Common Fisheries Policy  
Calls were made by the fishing industry to reform the CFP, and in 2014, the European 
Commission tried to do so, putting forth reforms that would increase the labor market mobility of 
fishers.78 But these schemes were criticized as they did not consider the local and cultural factors 
enough and did not give countries greater control over the quota issue. The reforms adjusted the 
European maritime and fisheries fund and allowed member states to manage 89% of it, while the 
European Commission would manage 11%.79 But, that did not fix the problematic and unpopular 
element of being too distant and top-down, with rules dictated by Brussels, far away from the 
UK and far away from understanding the local fishers’ needs.80 They seemed like mere bandages 
that came nowhere near fixing the core issues. The fishers wanted greater say in fishery 
management; they wanted to decentralize the decision-making structures as they felt like 
bystanders in decisions that impacted them greatly; they wanted to take back control.   
 
IV: The Brexit Politics of Fishing 
  
Part 1: The Referendum  
   
The Policy Window for Fishers 
 
Fast forward to the EU referendum, and it was time for fishing’s ‘policy window’, if you 
will, under Leave’s rally cry of ‘Take Back Control’. It was finally time to expel the European 
vessels from British waters and manage their fish stocks independently. Rather than lobbying via 
campaign contributions, they teamed up with the Brexiteers and campaigned vociferously 
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through social media and demonstrations. Much like Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud’s theory, 
fishers picked the right-leaning Brexiteers to help them with their policy window.  
With UKIP’s Nigel Farage leading the way––a champion of the fishing industry since the 
mid-aughts––he teamed up with the campaign group Fishing for Leave (FFL) to storm social 
media and conduct demonstrations, calling for the UK to leave the EU and ipso facto leave the 
CFP. In an effort to make a public display of discontent and grievances a few days before the 
referendum, Farage led a 35-boat flotilla of fishers up the Thames where they met Bob Geldof 
and other Remainers.81 The flotilla included both English and Scottish fishers and ended up with 
them drenching Geldof’s boat with hoses while Geldof blasted 60s pop music, flicking Farage 
the V-sign.82 Farage responded, asserting that, “today’s flotilla is not a celebration or a party but 
a full-throttled protest. We want our waters back”83 and that “one thing I can promise you is you 
are about to hear a lot about the fishing industry.”84 They were vociferous lobbyists who later 
would become a key electoral constituency.  
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Figure 8, Flotilla battle over Brexit, June 23, 201685 
  
While Boris Johnson focused more on immigration and EU budget issues during 2016 
campaign, he called the policy “crazy”, leading Cameron and the Remain camp to defend the 
policy, asserting that the UK currently exports £1 billion of fish annually to the Single Market 
and proclaiming, “there’s no way we can get a better deal on the outside than the one we have on 
 





the inside.”86 However, Brexiteers saw it differently. The hope, and promise, was that leaving the 
EU would allow the UK to reclaim fishing dominance and sovereignty over their territorial and 
ancestral waters, which would in turn see fishing communities thrive again with replenished 
stock and the return of jobs. 
On June 26, 2016, the referendum was held, and the UK voted to leave 51% to 48%. The 
fishing industry, as predicted, was a firm supporter, especially the Scots, where most of the UK 
fishing industry existed. Figure 9 illustrates that almost half of all catches are actually landed in 
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A pre-referendum survey indicated that 92% of Scottish fishers intended to vote to leave, 
whereas the rest of Scotland voted to remain (62%).88 The fishing communities such as Banff 
and Buchan––home to the fishing ports of Fraserburgh and Peterhead (refer to figure 9)––voted 
for Brexit, with around 54% voting to leave.89 One might be confused by this stat as figure 10 
delineates the EU referendum results and how each part of the country voted, showing that the 
entirety of Scotland voted to remain, but it must be remembered that while the fishing 
communities voted to leave, they were outnumbered by the Remainers in their constituency. 
They were a small, disenfranchised group within a larger community and soon to become very 
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Part 2: The Trade Talks 
 
The Rise of the Politically Important Scottish Fishers: Who are They, What Do They Want?  
  
After Heath’s historic 1973 betrayal of fishing, Scotland’s north east fishing community 
channeled their anger by voting with the SNP for the following few decades. They wanted 
nothing to do with the treacherous Tories; best underscored by the 1973 quote from a UK civil 
servant: “In light of Britain’s wider European interests they, the Scottish fishermen, are 
expendable.”91 While the Scottish Tories initially lost the community’s trust, gaining it back was 
easier than one may think as the Scottish fisheries did not ideologically align with the rest of 
Scotland and the SNP. Brexit was the perfect opportunity to regain the fishers’ trust and their 
vote as it was sold as a way to take back control and revitalize the declining industry.  
Leading up to the referendum, Craig McAngus conducted a survey of Scottish fishers’ 
political, social, and constitutional attitudes and found that they were: (1) a unionized industrial 
working class made up mostly of middle-aged men with standard grade qualifications who value 
self-sufficiency and sense of freedom to succeed in their profession, and take on a libertarian 
ideology that is skeptical of state intervention; (2) very Eurosceptic, portraying themselves as 
“victims of an overly bureaucratic and unsympathetic governance regime'' thus often voting 
Conservative rather than Labour (who value collectivism and socialist principles); (3) differing 
from the rest for the Scottish population in that they actually trusted the UK Government more 
than the Scottish Government, which seems contradictory at first given Heath's 1973 betrayal for 
access to the Single Market, however, their support relates to the Scottish independence 
movement; (4) unionist in nature, they do not support independence.  
 
 





An Overview of Scottish Independence  
 
One might now be wondering what the Scottish independence movement is and why it is 
relevant to understanding why fishing became the bulwark during trade talks. The Scottish 
independence debate raises the question of whether Scotland should remain part of the UK or 
become an independent country. In 2014, Scotland voted to remain in the UK, 55% to 45%, but 
that never really settled the debate; Scotland's First Minister Nicola Sturgeon continues to push 
for another referendum. And, when Scottish voters backed Remain––62% to 32%––her calls 
were as loud as ever, arguing that it was undemocratic for Scotland to be “dragged out of the EU 
against its will”, demanding another referendum on independence––indyref2––and then re-
joining the EU.92 In the aftermath of the referendum, along with their 2019 general election 
gains, the SNP has been arguing that they have a “cast iron mandate to hold another 
referendum.”93 The issue is that the UK PM has to grant formal permission for them to hold a 
referendum; something that Boris has not been keen on as he is a firm supporter of a united 
United Kingdom.94 Boris and other opponents of independence argue that the 2014 referendum 
was a once in a generation opportunity––a phrase Sturgeon actually campaigned on back in 
2014. They have taken this phrase to mean that another referendum should not be held for 
another 40 years, or more.  
 The issue, however, is that the Scottish people are becoming more pro-independent due 
to Brexit, and with the upcoming May 2021 Scottish Parliament election, many Conservatives 
worry that the SNP will gain more seats and inch closer to having basically all of the seats in 
Scottish Parliament, and thus risking independence. Opinion polls saw a material shift from a 
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slight majority indicating they would vote for independence in 2019 to a more material majority 
in 2020. Analysts attribute this shift to Brexit and also to Sturgeon's handling of COVID, which 
many believe has been better than Boris’. With polls indicating that the SNP is on course to win 
an overall majority in the May 2021 Scottish Parliament election, polling expert Sir John Curtice 
claims that the country “seems headed for a significant clash between the UK and Scottish 
governments over whether another independence referendum should be held.”95  
With that, fishing becomes critical for the Conservative government for multiple electoral 
reasons. The fisheries voted SNP in the years after Heath’s betrayal as Alex Salmond was SNP 
leader (1990-2000 and 2004-2014) and was strongly against the CFP, proposing bills that would 
bring Britain out of the CFP.96 And in fact, during the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, 
Salmond made fishing a material role in the SNP’s campaign, asserting that if independence was 
gained, fishing would be the #1 national priority and would have direct representation in the 
EU.97 But the issue was that the fishers wanted out of the EU; they did not want more 
representation in the EU as they did not want to be in the CFP at all. Ultimately, the 
independence referendum would fail, and Salmond would go on to step down as leader in 2014 
later losing his fishing community seat––Gordon––to Scottish Conservatives in 2017, who were 
set on taking the UK out of the EU and were “proud to be part of the UK.”98 
Once they had the fishing industry’s support, they could prevent independence by 
keeping the vote, but they would need to show them that they could be trusted after the Heath 
betrayal. However, the SNP was on the other side, trying to regain coastal communities and 
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trying to illustrate that the Tories could not be trusted.99 How were they to do this? By making 
fishing a key part of the ‘exit-negotiations.’  
 
May and the Scottish Fishers 
After the referendum, Cameron stepped down and Theresa May assumed Tory 
leadership. Electoral politics became incredibly important and influential as she tried to lead the 
UK out of the EU. In April of 2017, she called a general election for June 8th, hoping to increase 
her party’s lower house slim majority. If she could successfully gain a larger majority, her 
government would have a stronger mandate to negotiate a Brexit deal with the EU, as it would be 
easier to pass legislation and avoid the ‘no deal’ Brexit nuclear option. However, as fate would 
have it, May did not gain a majority due to a resurgent Labour party and had to form a 
confidence and supply agreement with ten MPs of Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP).100  
While she was unable to secure that majority, she did gain some interesting Scottish 
coastal seats. During the EU referendum, the SNP campaigned hard for Remain, and desired to 
stay in the CFP, but sought reform. This did not bode well with Scottish fishers. Given that the 
fishing industry did not want to remain in the CFP nor the EU and did not want independence, 
and were not collectivist or socialists, at the time, the only clear party left for them was the 
Scottish Tory Party. Thus, when the Conservatives promised that leaving the EU would ‘take 
back control’ of UK waters, Tories secured a dozen seats from the SNP during the election. 
Tories increased their hold from one seat in 2015, to 13 in 2017, gaining the north east fishing 
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community seats as per figure 11 which illustrates the shift from 2015 to 2017, where the SNP is 
yellow, Liberal Democrats are orange, Labour is red, and the Tories are blue. 101   
 
Figure 11102 
Suddenly, Scottish fishers––as well as the DUP––became the preeminent political group 
for May as they were some of the few who kept her party from anemic minority status; 
appeasing them and, as mentioned earlier, creating and maintaining trust, would be necessary in 
order to get her deal executed and keep their seats.  
May proceeded with Brexit plans and announced a Fisheries Bill that would take back 
control of British waters and quotas imposed once the country withdrew from the EU.103 
Additionally, it was announced that the UK would be withdrawing from the 1960s London 
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Fisheries Convention, which allowed certain foreign vessels to be within the twelve-mile zone 
from UK shores. Fishers were quite pleased with this. But as 2017 progressed, EU countries 
whose fishing industries were heavily dependent on access to UK waters became worried that 
access would be completely cut off, while the EU worried about setting an undesirable precedent 
for other countries if the UK were to get away with blocking complete access to UK waters. 
Denmark said it had historical rights to fish in British waters dating back to the 1400s, while 
other EU countries claimed the as UN Convention on the Law of the Sea stated that countries 
must respect the ‘traditional fishing rights’ of each other, access to British waters must be 
retained as it fell under ‘traditional rights.’104 Denmark continued pontificating that if the UK 
wanted to sell fish in the Single Market, then EU vessels must continue to be allowed to fish in 
UK waters.105 It became a seemingly never-ending battle between the two former partners.  
In March of 2018, then Brexit Secretary David Davis and EU’s Brexit Negotiator, Michel 
Barnier, announced that the UK and the EU agreed on a Brexit transition deal. However, in order 
to achieve the deal, they made a fishing concession; their first fatal flaw. Fisheries would be 
required to follow the CFP rules until the end of the December 2020 transition period.106 The UK 
fishing industry was infuriated. Bertie Armstrong, CEO of the Scottish Fishermen's Federation, 
said, “This falls far short of an acceptable deal. We will leave the EU and leave the CFP, but 
hand back sovereignty over our seas a few seconds later… Our fishing communities’ fortunes 
will still be subject to the whim and largesse of the EU for another two years.”107 Nigel Farage 
took to protesting again on a fishing boat going up and down the Thames outside of Parliament, 
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while chucking dead haddock into the river. SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon took to Twitter hoping 
to sway the fishers back over to SNP stating: “This is shaping up to be a massive sellout of the 
Scottish fishing industry by the Tories. The promises that were made to them during #EUref and 
since are already being broken as many of us warned they would be.”108 Fishers started to fear 
that they had been tricked into a “bait-and-switch exercise” in which they were a shiny object 
that would lure in the gullible public to back Brexit, and that future capitulation was inevitable as 
the EU would use continued access to UK fishing waters as bait for wider post-Brexit trade 
deal.109 Lastly, the 13 Scottish Conservative MPs said the deal was like, “drink[ing] a pint of 
cold sick” and assured that they would be prepared to vote against their own party and reject the 
deal if they did not see a return to full control of British waters to UK fishers. A sense of betrayal 
was real. The issue was that May really needed their votes, yet she had lost their trust.110 
May would go on to put forth two other deals but was only to be met with sound 
rejection. In June 2019 she stepped down and Boris Johnson assumed leadership in July.  
 
Boris and the Scottish Fishers 
With May’s Brexit failure in the rearview mirror, Boris was keen on driving the UK out 
of the EU and would rather be, “dead in a ditch”, than extend the UK’s EU departure beyond 
October 31, 2019.111 However, after their May betrayal, he had little support amongst the 
Scottish Conservatives and fishers. In August, Scottish Tory leader Ruth Davidson resigned to 
“spend more time with her family” ... which translates into she did not approve of Boris’ 
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leadership.112 Davidson worried that a Johnson government would boost support for 
independence, given his hard-liner Brexit stance stood in complete opposition to the rest of 
Scotland and the SNP.113 Boris, however, had a different agenda; one that was keen on 
maintaining the union. Appeasing the fishing industry was his way to do that––a realization after 
his own muck up with the industry during his election.  
In July 2019, he made his first visit to Scotland and pledged that fishing access would not 
be sacrificed in the new Brexit deal.114 He promised that the UK would meet the December 2020 
deadline for exiting the CFP and exclaimed that it was “bizarre” that the SNP wanted to hand 
back control to Brussels.115 The Scottish fishers welcomed his rhetoric as Bertie Armstrong said, 
“We have been looking for a straight and direct answer and that’s exactly what we have got… 
Scottish fishing’s sea of opportunity lies on the other side of Brexit.”116 Additionally, he assured 
them that he would “strengthen the union” and pledged £300m for boosting growth in the 
devolved nations, trying to counteract critics who said his no deal strategy would break up the 
UK.117 Among those critics were Nicola Sturgeon, who branded Johnson as “last prime minister 
of the UK”... (seemingly resonating with Johnson, as we will see his general election focused 
heavily on maintaining a united United Kingdom).118  
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With that said, while he took a strong stance against Scottish independence, his attention 
to fishing seemed to wane a bit during his own 2019 snap election as he focused on other 
domestic needs. After a series of controversial events in the Fall of 2019––proroguing Parliament 
and then withdrawing the whip from 21 MPs who voted against his government on his Brexit 
vote––he had to break his promise as he was left with no majority in Parliament, finding it 
impossible to get Brexit legislation through, which seemed to be a repeat of May’s tenure. He 
initiated the Benn Act that would prevent the UK from leaving the EU and extend the divorce 
date until January 31, 2020. With that, he called a snap election for December 12, 2019 and 
campaigned with the slogan of “Get Brexit Done.” 
While he kept Scotland in his sights, most of his attention was to mainland England, 
hoping to gain back the English voters who defected to Labour in 2017.119 He visited Scotland 
once during the month-long campaign, where he delivered the Scottish Conservative manifesto, 
claiming that Scotland was “paralyzed” by the SNP and asserted that:  
“This is a crucial election for Scotland. A vote for the Scottish Conservatives is a vote to 
stop a second independence referendum and to get Brexit done… Only a vote for the 
Conservatives will stop the SNP’s plans to break up the UK.”120,121 
However, given that May lost many of the English votes to Labour in 2017, he also 
needed to focus on those votes and more domestic issues that affected a larger proportion of the 
population. The bulk of his campaign message centered around a tripart agenda: get Brexit done 
 
119 Tim Ross, “Boris Johnson’s Tories Abandoned Scotland to Win Their Big Victory,” Bloomberg, December 23, 
2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-23/how-johnson-s-tories-ditched-scotland-to-rule-a-
divided-kingdom. 
120 “General Election 2019: Boris Johnson Claims Scotland 'Paralysed' by SNP,” BBC News, November 26, 2019, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2019-50561993. 
121 Reuters Staff, “Boris Johnson to Tell Scotland: Vote Conservative to Stop Independence Bid,” Reuters, 









Figure 12, a campaign post taken from Boris Johnson’s Twitter account122 
 
In addition to canvassing across the country and delivering party speeches, as an avid 
social media politician, Boris harnessed his Twitter prowess to connect with constituents, but 
spoke less about fishing, and more about those three campaign stances. In total, Boris tweeted 62 
times regarding his campaign agenda, while only tweeting about fishing a mere five times, and 
Scotland nine times. 
 





Figure 13123  
 
However, when he spoke about fishing and Scotland, he used language focused on unity 
and controlling the waters, indicating their congruency. He used phrases such as: “better 
together”; “strengthening our Union of four nations”; “working to find ways to promote 
Scotland's place in our UK”; and “In Scotland today… the UK is truly better together.”124 Below 
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Nov 8, 2019  Terrific time on the trail in Teesside, Scotland 
& Northern Ireland yesterday. Everyone is 
rightfully optimistic about the future we can 
all have. We just need to end the gridlock in 
Parliament. A @Conservatives majority will 
#GetBrexitDone & get Parliament working 
again for you. 
Dec 9, 2019 “Let’s get Brexit done and take back control 
of our fishing waters” 
Dec 9, 2019 “Our new Brexit deal means we will take 
back control of our fishing waters and 
support our fantastic fishing industries” 
Dec 14, 2019 We are going to unite and level up, bringing 
the whole of this incredible United Kingdom - 
England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland - 
together. 
 
With much focus on his campaign and independence, fishers in the coastal towns were 
getting worried that fishing was not his foremost priority and became more apprehensive and 
questioned his true intentions:  
“There's a calculation that the fishing industry is making that there's a heavy risk they 
will get sold out on the way out of the EU, just like they did on the way in” … and 
considered “would SNP get a better deal for Scottish fishing from the EU?”125  
They also worried that because Boris “changes his mind like the weather” they were unsure if he 
would protect fishing or divert his focus towards other aspects in the UK during the trade 
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talks.126 They were not confident in Boris and feared that he would make them expendable again 
for greater access to the Single Market; Ted Heath 2.0.127  
Election day came, and while Boris won the largest majority since Thatcher, he lost some 
crucial seats in Scotland and one saw a small swing back to SNP, which won 48 out of 59 
seats.128 Boris was able to keep three of the coastal communities but lost Gordon and Angus; two 
key fishing communities. In figures 14 and 15, blue represents Conservatives, red Labour, and 
Yellow SNP.  
 
          Figure 14, 2017 results         Figure 14, 2019 results129 
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Analyzing the election, Fiona Simpkins found three key takeaways: (1) the Scottish 
Conservatives, while they maintained the some of the Leave vote, saw an increase in support for 
the SNP from both Remain (+9%) and Leave voters (+3%); (2) going into the trade talks, a May 
2020 Ipsos Mori poll for BBC Scotland found that the majority of Scotland supported a second 
referendum (63%).130 Although a tabloid journalist, Torcuil Crichton provided thoughtful 
insight, noting that Tory 2017 gains were halved in 2019, and any further “betrayal” of the 
fishing industry “will fuel the independence argument and undermine the principles Brexit was 
fought on.”131  
Suddenly, the realization of Scottish independence began to sink in; Boris needed to 
show Scotland the benefits of staying in the UK; he needed to show that Brexit was good for 
Scottish communities. The fishing industry was the perfect political tool for such. He could argue 
that he was going to secure them a good deal; stand up for the disenfranchised against Brussels; 
and bring back industry. He could argue that he was paying attention to Scottish needs and as 
such, they should stay in the UK rather than back the independence preoccupied SNP. If he could 
show that, then he may be able to wield some political clout during the independence debate, 
which would inevitably follow. It is for this reason that fishing was greatly amplified during the 
trade talks. The Tories needed to secure the Scottish fishing industry––the rare industry that had 
yet to back SNP fully and was against independence––a good deal or else potentially be forced to 
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With the general election behind him and the risk of Scottish independence at the 
forefront of his mind, Boris entered the trade talk interval. Immediately after the election, he 
pledged to the fishing communities that he would “work flat-out” and protect the Scottish fishing 
industry to keep their backing.132 While this exposé took the perspective of the UK, the EU 
perspective of the talks must briefly be mentioned, as the UK was not the only amplifier of fish; 
it was a two-way water route.  
Just as with the UK, fishing is an economically insignificant industry for the EU overall, 
however, it has substantial economic and political leverage in the coastal communities of France, 
Spain, and Denmark. Annually, EU fleets haul in roughly 700,000 tons of fish in UK waters. 
British waters have fish that are the staples of the European diet: herring, mackerel, and sole as 
well as shellfish such as langoustine.133 Herring and mackerel are Denmark's most popular 
seafood, and it would be impossible to catch their quota if they could no longer fish UK waters; 
devastating the industry.  
For France, on the other hand, it was more about political weight; similar to what we see 
with Boris. As journalist John Lichfield pointed out, "The north of France, around Boulogne, is 
hugely important for the presidential election in 2022… The regional president... might well be 
one of Macron's main rivals at that time, so [Macron] needs to be seen to be supporting what is 
already a struggling area economically.”134 Additionally, as mentioned earlier, the EU was 
determined to not set an undesirable precedent; they could not let Britain dictate access to such 
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waters and potentially illustrate the EU as weak and exposed to other countries trying the same. 
This, as well as many other reasons, was why the EU was determined that the current level of 
access to UK waters must be maintained, and why Phil Hogan––the EU’s Trade Commissioner–
–assured Johnson that if he wanted to gain access to EU financial markets, the UK would have to 
allow EU vessels in British fishing waters.135  
During the trade talks, Boris channeled James I, taking a strong counter to Macron and 
other EU officials who wanted the status quo ante. He argued that Britain must take back control 
of their waters and was fixed on replacing the CFP with ‘zonal attachment’, which would offer a 
significant increase in hauls for British fleets.136 Elspeth Macdonald, chief executive of the 
Scottish Fishermen’s Federation, assured Boris that any permanent concessions to the EU would 
be a “betrayal of the industry” demanding “immediate cuts in the proportion of the UK quota 
taken by EU vessels and ‘year-on-year gains’ for Scottish fishers” concluding that, “while access 
to EU markets is important, the ability to determine access to our waters is the key goal for 
us.”137 Trying to mediate the tensions, EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, said that both sides 
needed to back away from their ‘maximalist positions’ on access to British waters, or else both 
sides risk losing––EU locked out of UK waters, and UK crashing out with no deal.138  
 
The Deal 
Now, we come full circle, back to the famed scallop and turbot dinner on December 9, 
2020, when Johnson and von der Leyen sat down to hash out the final open issue. Britain 
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demanded 80% of the EU’s catch to be returned to the UK, however, they reduced this to 60% as 
a compromise; Barnier countered with 20%.139 The UK demanded that this transition would take 
no longer than three years, while the EU asked for a 14-year transition period, which they then 
reduced to seven. Additionally, the EU asked for its fishing vessels to be able to fish in the six-
to-twelve-mile zone from British coastline, but the UK insisted that EU vessels be banned from 
this zone. Von der Leyen left the dinner saying the two sides remained “far apart.”140 The whole 
trade deal was on the line, with only a few days to go. Finally, on Christmas Eve, mere moments 
before the UK would crash out of the EU, they came to a deal. The 1,200-page document was 
passed by MPs on December 30th, 521 to 73; the UK and EU secured a deal. The deal goes as 
follows:  
1. Phased over five and a half years, where EU vessels will still be able to fish in UK waters 
during this time. During the adjustment period, EU quotas will decrease by 15% in the 
first year, and then two and a half per cent for the following four years. That means by 
year five, the UK will regain 25% of the current EU catch in British waters.  
2. Fish will continue to be traded between the two parties with no tariffs imposed.  
3. After the five-year adjustment period is over, the UK and EU will enter into annual 
negotiations where they will decide the quota of fish that EU vessels are allowed to catch 
in UK waters.141  
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Boris announced the deal while wearing a fish patterned tie and stated that it was a great deal in 
which fishers saw their hauls increase from half of the fish quota in British waters under CFP, to 
about two-thirds by the end of the adjustment period.142 After all that, it was over. Or was it?  
 
V: Conclusions 
Summary of Findings 
While fisheries were the losers that lobbied hard to grab the government's attention 
initially during the Brexit campaign––much like Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud’s theory––it 
appears that May and then Boris needed the fishers after the campaign and during the exit 
negotiations and thus took a hard position on access to UK waters, however, not for social merit, 
but rather, for their electoral and self-interested gains––like Hillmen’s theory. Matt Bevington––
an analyst with UK in a Changing Europe––points out that Johnson saw fishing as one of the few 
areas where the government could be able to score a “win” and tout as evidence of Brexit’s 
success.143 Barrie Deas––CEO of the National Federation of Fishermen’s Organization––said 
that in many respects, fishing is a “litmus” test for Brexit, meaning that we will not know most of 
the effects of the Brexit deal for years, or even decades, however, a good or bad deal for fishing 
will be realized immediately; there is political significance to his attention.144 Guardian journalist 
Daniel Boffey notes that fisheries are important to Johnson as he needs to show some benefit of 
Brexit to Scottish communities as Sturgeon ramps up her demands for another independence 
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referendum.145 In a similar vein, the Irish Times’ Denis Staunton emphasized that North East 
Scotland is now essential to Boris’ electoral constituency, and will play an important role in the 
Scottish independence debate over the next few years.146 He asserts that if Johnson secures 
greater access to fishing waters for Scottish fishers, he will be able to argue against the SNP’s 
goal of bringing an independent Scotland into the EU as fishers will then be “doomed to return to 
lower shares under the CFP”.147 But, as we just saw, if he is unable, SNP may snatch up fishers 
who would feel that they are being treated as expendable by the Tories, again, thus leaving the 
entirety of Scotland under SNP control in the 2021 Scottish elections, and christen the 
independence movement; and no PM wants the UK to break up during their watch. Thus, it 
seems that the answer to our paradox lies in a mix of history, symbolism, lobbying, and legacy 




While it was a Christmas miracle in many respects, the aftermath has not been so merry. 
Boris was unable to provide the fishing industry the deal they wanted, and more importantly, 
were expecting, but does that mean he is now doomed, and Scottish independence is a fait 
accompli? That cannot be foretold, and one will see in this coming May just how this all plays 
out. But there are many lessons to be learnt from this case study for future politicians and 
policymakers. Many promises were made throughout Brexit and the talks, hoping to illustrate the 
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government's commitment to the disenfranchised and their commitment to taking back control. 
Their promises, however, were not plausible let alone achievable. In this globalized world, the 
UK will never regain their lost empire nor take back full control, especially when it wants to 
trade with the EU; sovereignty is a myth in that respect, but the Brexiteers did not clarify that to 
the voters, and thus they were let down. This becomes an issue of electoral campaign rhetoric 
and promises. Fishers were not pleased with his deal: “The deal was absolutely shameful and 
disgraceful—that’s the only way to describe it...They broke their word on every count in effect” 
said Plymouth Trawler David Pessell. Fishing for Leave saw Boris as a Heath 2.0, just as they 








And now, the Scottish independence movement is in full swing again, with the SNP 
harnessing this fishing failure as another reason for why they should leave the UK; something 
Boris tried to prevent. Electoral politics influenced the amplification of the industry during the 
talks. And in so doing, it amplified a delicate social, economic, and political bond that is about 
ready to snap. However, the main lessons scholars can glean from this case study is the extreme 
influence of domestic electoral politics in trade agreements:  
1. Just because an industry is economically insignificant, does not mean it will not have 
political weight or be significant in other terms in the international arena. Not everything 
in trade talks distills down to economics. Declining domestic industries, more likely than 
not, will be protected in trade talks for electoral purposes.  
2. Towards the end of negotiations, however, when realities set in, economics can become 
relevant, rather dictating. Boris was a champion of the industry all the way to the end, but 
ultimately, he had to secure a deal that would allow European vessels access to UK 
waters for a limited time in order to salvage the trade agreement. Economics were placed 
higher than politics. As Barrie Deas said, “It’s what we always feared… When you get to 
the endgame in the negotiations it becomes a binary choice and economics prevail over 
the politics. I think that’s what’s happened and it’s really not good news.” Ultimately, 
Boris needed a deal; for better or for worse.149 
3. Politicians must be careful when picking which industries to amplify. If they are going to 
propose certain outcomes, and cannot deliver on those promises, they risk causing more 
chaos––this was seen with both Cameron and Johnson.  
 




4. With that being said, politicians seem to pick easy to understand industries in order to get 
their message across. It is all about easy and clear messaging––something the Remain 
camp struggled to achieve. Boris harnessed the disenfranchised with a message centered 
around the notion that “what does Brussels know about potholes in London.” His intent 
with the fishing industry was to illustrate an example of him protecting local to show (1) 
that Brexit can be a success and (2) that he was fighting for Scottish industry, and that 
they should not defect to the SNP.  It was an easy industry that many people could 
understand as it portrayed Brussels as treating them unfairly with the draconian quotas. 
Imagine trying to amplify intellectual property rights; few people would latch on to that. 
These were local fishers––the heart and soul of the UK, even if they were no longer 
economically significant––being taken advantage of by Brussels. They also happened to 
be politically right-leaning and resided in the hostile territory of Scotland.  
5. As we enter a more international world, we see more emphasis on interdependence and 
transnationalism, often glazing over domestic factors. But, as Tip O’Neill famously 
quipped: “all politics is local” or rather, “all local politics are global” … especially in free 
trade agreements. Constituents care more about what is going on at the home front, rather 
than what is going on in Brussels. They care about how Brussels affects them at home 
more than being in an economically logical partnership with the EU, especially in this 
global game of populist politics.  
6. Thus, as Putnam theorized in 1988, international negotiations are a 2-level game in which 
domestic groups pressure the government to adopt favorable policies as the politicians 
seek to amplify their power by consulting coalitions with these groups. They then go to 




while balancing the needs of their international partners. But, for altruistic means? Not 
necessarily. The self-serving interests of the politician and the need to get re-elected and 
legacy presides over the strategy they bring to the negotiation table and the industries 
they choose to protect. It seems that electoral politics is at the heart of all politics; 
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